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employer and the primary employer. The present court implicitly found that
an intent to break down relations between neutrals was sufficient. Certainly
the section's broad language permits this finding; yet, on this point, one case
stands contrary to the instant decision. In Retail Fruit Clerks v. NLRB, 2 '
the Ninth Circuit held that picketing the entrance to a large market complex
when the dispute was solely with the lessor who operated a minority of the
stands inside was an unlawful secondary boycott. In dicta, however, the
court stated its understanding of the section "indicates that the neutral em-
ployer must be doing some sort of business with the primary employer." 22
The court was silent on the merits of the Board's argument that there would
be a violation if there was only a disruption of the neutral's business with his
suppliers and found a violation in that the lessor and lessee were forced to
cease doing business with one another. Under this rationale, since Cambridge
Carriers, the primary employer in the dispute, did no business with any of
the employers involved in the work stoppage in New Orleans, there was no
cessation of the business dealings between the primary employer and neutral
employers and hence there was no violation.
Despite the apparently unanimous agreement of congressmen and the
weight of case authority that the section is sufficiently broad to forbid sec-
ondary pressures arising out of inter-union disputes, section 8(b) (4) (1) (ii)
(B) contains a clause that secondary work stoppages or coercion, where an
object is "forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees" are pro-
hibited unless "such labor organization has been certified as the representative
of such employees...." Since Congress was apparently willing to allow neutral •
employers to be injured by a certified union when a primary employer refused
to recognize it, it is possible to argue that the•NMU should have been able
to institute secondary pressure against MEBA. The harm to the neutral is
as great whether the original source of the pressure is a union-employer or
an inter-union dispute, and there is no reason to permit this form of union
self-help in the one instance and not in the other. The purpose of Congress in
allowing this exception to the prohibition against secondary pressures seems
to be to secure the recognition of the certified union as bargaining agent, and
it would be in line with this policy to secure acquiescence from a rival union
as well as from the employer. On this reasoning, the instant decision is
questionable.
DANIEL C. SAcCO
Mortgages and Mechanics' Lieni—Priorities Where Separate Contracts
Are Performed Subsequent to Attachment of the Mortgage Lien.-
American-First Title Z.1 Trust Co. v. Ewing.'—First Federal Savings and
Loan Association, a Kansas lending institution, was mortgagee of the real
estate in question, located in Oklahoma. Upon the mortgagor's failure to
21 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
22 Id. at 594.
1 403 P.2d 488 (Okla. 1965).
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maintain payments, First Federal commenced foreclosure proceedings in
which American-First Title and Trust Company intervened as plaintiff be-
cause it had guaranteed the mortgage. The mortgaged property was subject
to mechanics' and materialmen's liens which had been perfected. The trial
court found that one defendant, Barlow, had commenced furnishing ma-
terials for the construction of a dwelling on the mortgaged premises on Sep-
tember 27, 1960, that the mortgage lien had been recorded two days later,
and that the owner had subsequently continued his construction project,
acting as his own general contractor and negotiating oral contracts with the
remaining mechanics and materialmen for separate segments of construction.
It was admitted that there had been full performance by each of the de-
fendant lienors, after which proper lien statements had been filed. The trial
court determined that the construction project had been continuous but that
there was no general contract.' Upon these fact findings, it entered judgment
permitting all lienors to foreclose, and adjudging all of the mechanics' and
materialmen's liens superior to plaintiff's mortgage Nen. The plaintiff's motion
for a new trial as to that portion of the decision which established the pri-
ority of the defendants' liens was denied, and it appealed. By stipulation, the
parties accepted the facts as found by the trial court, as well as the priority
of Barlow's lien. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma HELD: Where there is a
continuous construction project but no general contract, the rights of the
mortgage lien claimant are superior to those of after-acquired mechanics' and
materialmen's lienors.3 In rendering its present decision, the court expressly
overruled its holding in Industrial Tile Co. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n4
and re-adopted the rule of law first pronounced in Fleharty & Co. v. National
Loan & Inv. Co.5
These cases were decided under a single controlling statute° which had
been amended in 1919. 7 The applicable portion of the statute prior to 1919
read:
2 The construction of a dwelling may be said to be continuous when the activity
continues from cellar bole to finished product without interruption or abandonment. The
general contract would arise between the owner and a home builder who would sub-
contract portions of the project to various tradesmen. Contracts of this nature are
governed by Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 143 (1951). That act protects all subcontractors by
vesting their liens as of the date of the general contract.
a However, the court chose to limit the effect of its decision by making the new
rule prospective only. The judgment of the trial court here was affirmed. It could be said
that appellant here lost the battle but won the war. The concept of prospective relief in
this type of case appears proper. See Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1947). The court should,
however, have declared that rights of parties which vested on or before the date of deci-
sion would be governed by the rule of Industrial Tile. Such a pronouncement would have
eliminated uncertainty within the construction and lending communities as to priorities
of liens arising after Industrial Tile but before this decision.
4 331 P.2d 918 (Okla. 1958).
5 89 Okla. 292, 215 Pac. 744 (1923).
0
 R.L. 1910 § 3862, Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 141 (1951).
7
 Laws 1919, ch. 258, § 1, at 367. This statute was also amended in 1923; however,
the 1923 amendment is not applicable to the present discussion since it was concerned with
that portion of the statute dealing with contracts made by a lessee. Laws 1923, ch. 54, § 1,
at 97.
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Any person who shall, under oral or written contract with the
owner of any tract or piece of land, perform labor, or furnish ma-
terial for the erection, alteration or repair of any building, improve-
ment, or structure thereon . . . shall have a lien upon the whole of
said tract or piece of land, the buildings and appurtenances. .. .
Such liens shall be preferred to all other liens or incumbrances which
may attach to or upon such land, buildings or improvements or either
of them, subsequent to the commencement of such building . . . 8
(Emphasis added.)
The 1919 amendment added:
. . . and such lien shall follow said property and each and every
part thereof, and be enforceable against the said property wherever
the same may be found, and compliance with the provisions of
this Article shall constitute constructive notice of the claimant's lien
to all purchasers and encumbrancers of said property or any part
thereof, subsequent to the date of the furnishing of the first item
of material or the date of the performance of the first labor. 9 (Em-
phasis added.)
The controlling statute is logically capable of two distinct constructions:
one making the commencement of the construction project the date from
which all liens emanate, the other establishing the lien of each participating
mechanic and materialman from the date of his initial contribution to the
project. In some previous cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had referred
to the commencement of construction 1° as decisive in ascertaining the point
in time at which all mechanics' liens attached, while on other occasions the
furnishing of first material or performance of first labor by the individual
lienor had been held to be the determinant. 11 Prior to American-First, the
court had been confronted only twice with cases which demanded that the
time of attachment of mechanics' liens be preCisely defined. The first oc-
casion was the 1923 Fleharty case" where the court construed a plumbing
contract to be separate from the contract between the property owner and
the builder because the plumbing company was not a party to the original
contract. It was there held that the plumbing lien attached on " 'the date of
the furnishing of the first item of material or the date of the performance
of the first labor' under the plumbing contract."18 (Emphasis added.)
A factual situation more closely resembling that of the instant case was
presented in Industrial Tile," where the court ruled that:
8 R.L. 1910 § 3862, Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 141 (1951).
9 Laws 1919, ch. 258, 4 1, at 367.
10 See, e.g., Pittsburg Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Standard Lumber Co., 148 Okla. 297,
298 Pac. 885 (1931) ; Dickason Goodman Lumber Co. v. Foresman, 120 Okla. 168, 251 Pac.
70 (1926); Sherbondy v. Tulsa Boiler & Mach. Co., 99 Okla. 214, 226 Pac. 564 (1924).
11 See, e.g., Antrim Lumber Co. v. Claremore Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 204 Okla. 387,
230 P.2d 274 (1951) ; Antrim Lumber Co. v. Anderson, ,173 Okla. 371, 48 P.2d 825 (1935) ;
Braden Co. v. Robinson, 171 Okla. 278, 43 P.2d 437 (1934).
12 Fleharty & Co. v. National Loan & Inv. Co., supra note S.
18 Id. at 293, 215 Pac. at 746.
14 Industrial Tile Co. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 4.
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The determinative factor, therefore, is that the owner have one
project. How many persons he enters into contracts with to complete
the project is of no concern. The lien of such person for the portion
of the project performed by him, or it, is preferred and prior to
all encumbrances which attach upon the land and building after
the commencement of the building. In other words the lien in such
case attaches as of the date of the commencement of the building,
not as of the particular date of the furnishing of the material or
performance of the labor of each. 15
The Industrial Tile court distinguished the factual situation presented in
Fleharty, emphasizing that the project must be continuous in order to invoke
the general contract theory which protects all mechanics and materialmen
from the date of the first performance under the general contract. Industrial
Tile indicated that the absence of a formal general contractor did not war-
rant a denial of the protection to mechanics and materialmen of the relating-
back theory of the general contract rule. So long as the project was con-
tinuous (not comprised of separate and distinct projects), the statute would
protect the rights of late starting mechanics and materialmen from the date
of the first mechanic's or materialman's performance.'°
The court in American-First expressly overruled Industrial Tile and
revived Fleharty. It attempted to justify its departure from the rule and
rationale of Industrial Tile by resorting to a reappraisal of the Fleharty facts,
stressing the amendatory language of the statute. It failed, however, to in-
dicate the method by which its reappraisal of Fleharty was accomplished and
merely stated that
on re-examination of the Fleharty case we can only conclude that
the case was decided upon the grounds that there was one con-
tinuous building project but the materialman's lien claimant failed
to prove that it furnished labor and materials prior to the attach-
ment of the mortgage lien. 17
It is submitted that the rule of American-First is opposed to the his-
torical expansion of mechanics' liens in Oklahoma and is contrary to the rule
in Kansas, the state from which the statute was derived, as well as to the
equities of the factual situation presented. Although, prior to 1919, the court
was not called upon to answer the precise question which was before it in
the present case,-it would appear that, had the issue arisen, the court would
have ruled that the date on which construction began was the critical date
15 Id. at 920.
16 Id. at 921:
However, as applied to the assumed state of facts as outlined in the opinion, it
not appearing that there was one continuous building project, and limited to the
situation disclosed therein, the construction of § 141, supra, in the case of
Fleharty v. National Loan & Inv. Co., supra, was correct and properly fixed the
priority of the mortgage over the lien. This being true such case is not only not in
conflict with, but is in conformity with our holding in this case.
17 Supra note 1, at 492.
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in fixing priorities.' 8 Such a ruling would have been consistent with the rule
in Kansas."
The status of liens and encumbrances on property is normally deter-
mined by their priority in point of time,20 and the determination of priority
by the date of commencement of construction constitutes an exception to the
rule. The courts of Oklahoma, in interpreting the statute creating the ex-
ception, have expressed the opinion that the legislative intent behind its
enactment was the protection of the classes therein named. 21 Therefore, the
mechanics' lien statute is to be liberally construed in favor of those persons
who bring themselves within its provisions. 22 Applying a liberal construction
to the statute, it is difficult to accept the restrictive effect which the present
case attributes to it.
The absence of legislative clarity should not lead the court to interpret
the statute restrictively without full consideration of all relevant factors. The
present decision mentions four factors which would have to be disregarded
if all mechanics' and materialmen's liens were related back to the commence-
ment of the building. These factors are: (1) That the mechanics and ma-
terialmen had no privity of contract with the owner prior to the time the
mortgage lien attached; (2) that they deraigned no contractual, accrued or
vested rights from the owner; (3) that they had full notice and knowledge
of the mortgage lien when they first furnished labor and materials; and (4)
that they had no obligations to the owner or the mortgagee. 23 These factors,
though all significant, are not exclusive, and it is submitted that the following
factors, which the instant court failed to consider, make the rule of In-
dustrial Tile the preferred method for establishing the vesting time for all
liens. It is important to recognize that, in Oklahoma, mechanics' liens and
18 Basham v. GOodholm & Sparrow Inv. Co., 52 Okla. 536, 152 Pac. 416 (1915).
19 Kansas Mortgage Co. v. Weyerhaeuser, 48 Kan. 335, 29 Pac. 153 (1892);
Deatherage & Ewart v. Henderson, 43 Kan. 684, 23 Pac. 1052 (1890).
20 Osborne, Mortgages § 181 (1951).
21 Eberle v. Drennan, 40 Okla. 59, 136 Pac. 162 (1913). In this case the court quoted
from Putnam v. Ross, 46 Mo. 337, 338 (1870):
The defendants' view seems to be founded upon the theory that the me-
chanic's lien enactment is in derogation of the common law, and that its provi-
sions are therefore to be construed with a rigid strictness against those who seek
to avail themselves of its intended benefits. There may be decisions which Iend
support to that theory, but the better opinion is that the provisions of the
mechanic's lien law should be interpreted so as to carry out the object had in
view by the Legislature in enacting it, namely: the security of classes of
persons named in the act, upon its provisions being in good faith substantially
complied with on their part. It has become the settled policy of this state, as in
most, if not all, the states, to secure mechanics and material-men by giving
them a lien upon the property they have contributed to improve or create. The
law itself has grown up from small beginnings to its present unquestioned im-
portance. And the whole course of legislation on the subject shows that it has
been the intention of the legislature to avoid unfriendly strictness and mere
technicality.
The spirit and purpose of the law is to do substantial justice to all parties
who may be affected by its provisions.
22 Martin Coal & Coke Co. v. Brewer, 185 Okla. 169, 90 P.2d 653 (1939) ; Neves v.
Mills, 74 Okla. 7, 176 Pac. 509 (1918).
23 Supra note 1, at 495.
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mortgage liens attach both to the Land and the improvements made upon
the land, so that the lien having first priority in foreclosure will obtain
satisfaction out of the entire proceeds of sale before other liens are satisfied. 24
AIso relevant is the fact that the mortgagee is ordinarily in a position to de-
termine the existence of a construction project and to protect himself ac-
cordingly. Chief Justice Halley's dissent in the present case sets out this
position:
The Legislature undoubtedly realized that it was better for the
lending agencies to determine what improvements were upon the
property when their mortgages are put of record. It is far better
that they have this responsibility than a laborer. When a mortgage
goes on record after a building is started the lending agency can
protect itself by refusing to make a loan or by seeing that all bills
are paid on the building as they accrued. 25
The legislature's intent to ignore the time-priority rule in situations where
a party is at a disadvantage because of his inferior bargaining position is
illustrated by the laborers' lien statute which provides that laborers' liens
will be superior to any other encumbrance "whether created prior or sub-
sequent to the laborer's lien."26 It cannot be said that the legislature, in
drafting the statutory language, was unaware of the inferiority of the bar-
gaining position held by mechanics and materialmen, nor can it be said that
the legislature did not intend to compensate that class by affording them
increased statutory protection.
The necessity to foreclose arises because of the mortgagor's default.
In such a situation it would seem that legislative enactments, and judicial
decisions under those enactments, should be concerned with balancing the
equities between two equally blameless parties who have dealt with the
defaulting mortgagor and, as between the two, it is submitted that assigning
mechanics' liens priority over those of mortgagees is normally the more just
solution. The lenders are much better equipped to invoke protective devices
which will avoid subordination of their claims. Their superior bargaining
position enables them to condition their secured loans with such self-pro-
tecting measures as the requirement of an affirmative statement by the
prospective mortgagor-builder that no prior contracts have been made with
•mechanics or materialmen. If the mortgagor is unable to make such an
affirmation, the lender can demand that waivers be secured from those me-
chanics and materialmen whose contract rights precede the mortgage. Still
another device would require the mortgagor-builder to present receipts to
the lender showing full payment of accrued construction costs before the
mortgagee makes any further payment, or an agreement allowing payment
of such costs directly by the lender. Each of these measures is in common
use and casts no undue burden upon the lender.
Other considerations also favor the priority of mechanics' liens over
24 Okla. Stat. tit. 42, § 141 (1951) ; Antrim Lumber Co. v. Claremore Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, supra note 11; Basham v. Goodholrn & Sparrow Inv, Co., supra note 18.
25 Supra note 1, at 496-97.
25 Okla. Stat. tit. 42,	 92-96 (1951).
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those of mortgagees. The mortgagee will normally accept a mortgage as
security for a loan only after a thorough credit check of the applicant, an
inspection of the record title of the property and a physical inspection of the
land. The mechanic is not in a bargaining position to demand such things as
waivers nor can he afford to make thorough investigations of those who re-
quest his services. The mortgagee should not be allowed to have the swollen
value of his secured asset accrue to him at the expense of the mechanics and
materialmen whose time, money, labor and material have made the increased
value a reality. The mechanics and materialmen, having fully performed,
should have a higher priority in foreclosure than the mortgagee who has suf-
fered only a defeat of his expectations by the failure of the mortgagor to
repay the personal obligation for which the mortgage served as security.
If the court maintains a rigid adherence to the time-priority rule, a more
equitable solution than the rule of the present case would' be to measure the
reasonable value of the services rendered by the mechanics and, as to that
amount, allow the mechanic first recovery from the proceeds of the fore-
closure sale. After the pool has been depleted to this extent, the full amount
of the mortgage claim would be disbursed and the mechanic would take the
remainder, if any, to make up any difference between the reasonable value
of his services and the contract price. This method would allow the interests
and equities to remain undisturbed; the mortgagee's anticipated enhance-
ment of the property's value would be subordinated to the reasonable value
of services rendered by the mechanic, while the mechanic's anticipated profit
would be inferior to the bargained-for benefit of the mortgagee.
The Fleharty, Industrial Tile and American-First decisions are demon-
strative of the judicial inconsistency which can be caused by legislative
ambiguity. The Oklahoma Legislature, which has not removed the ambiguous
language from its statute, must bear the major portion of the responsibility
for the confusion surrounding the question of which class of claimants is to
be favored. It remains to be seen whether the seven years of legislative
silence following the decision in Industrial Tile was an affirmation of that
interpretation of the statute or was the implied delegation of law-making
power to the court, for these diametrically opposite results on priority cannot
both reflect the intent of the legislature. The need for legislative action in
this area is clear and the type of legislation needed should reflect a balancing
of bargaining positions between mortgagees and mechanics and materialmen. •
JAMES B. KkomsrEic
Municipal Corporations—Special Assessments—Local Improvement Dis-
tricts.—Heavens v. Ring County Rural Library Dist. 1—This case in-
volves the constitutionality of a special or betterment assessment for the con-
struction of a library. A 1961 Washington statute2 empowers rural library
districts to form local improvement districts' and to finance new libraries by
1 404 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1965).
2
 Wash. Rev. Code § 27.14.020 (Supp. 1963).
8 A rural county library, district is a library serving all the area of a county not
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